From the Editor's Desk

The resignation of former Army Commander, General Sarath Fonseka from service has created fresh political stir and speculation about the next presidential election.

The possibility of fielding a non-party common candidate against the incumbent at the presidential election was in the air for several months, especially following the overwhelming victories by the ruling alliance in Provincial Council elections held in the wake of the military victory against the LTTE. The internal crisis within the UNP compelled it to consider the possibility. The prospect of fielding former Chief Justice Sarath Silva as a common candidate was pondered for some time but, with the emergence of evidence of a serious rift between the General and the President, the idea of fielding General Sarath Fonseka gained support among the opposition parties. The JVP was the first political party to openly endorse fielding him as the common candidate and the UNP informally indicated its willingness.

The UNP and the JVP, between them, have only Sinhala chauvinism in common, but political desperation seems to have become a strong uniting factor in the likely agreement on a common candidate. The prospect of General Fonseka being fielded as a presidential candidate endorsed by the two main opposition parties has serious implications for the two parties as well as for the minority nationality parties in the newly formed twelve-party alliance led by the UNP.

The JVP as a populist party with a ‘Marxist’ facade and chauvinist underpinnings has a support base among a section of the population which has been traditionally hostile to the UNP, which it has seen as a party of the pro-West elite. Supporting a common candidate who is not from the UNP but endorsed by it will only be a face-saving exercise but hard to defend against charges of collaboration with the UNP. The destruction of the credibility of the JVP as a political force is high on the agenda of the government since the JVP still has trade union muscle which it has flexed in recent months, without head-on confrontation. The government has already denounced the trade union action as JVP mischief aided by the UNP.

General Fonseka, a US Green Card holder, has not expressed any political opinion thus far except declaring several months ago that Sri Lanka is a country of the Sinhalese. How the Tamil, Muslim and Hill Country Tamil allies and potential allies of the UNP can come to terms with this view is a matter for speculation. But they should by now have their excuses ready. The question is how their electorates will respond to their political bankruptcy.

Much can happen between now and the elections, but the common candidacy poses serious political questions as the contest is for a very powerful post with virtually unlimited executive powers. Firstly, we have the question of the manifesto of the candidate. Mahinda Rajapakse produced a manifesto that was different things to different people and besides signed MoUs with some of his allies, all of which proved to be not binding upon him once elected to office. What kind of manifesto can one expect from a person with good military experience but no political experience? Secondly there is the question of how General Fonseka will use his power if elected to office. That may be decided to a considerable extent by ‘invisible’ forces within and outside the country that are behind his entry into politics. Thirdly we have the question of how the loose alliance that supports General Fonseka will present him to their respective electorates without contradictions that could be exploited by the government. There is no way of knowing what hold the various forces that back General Fonseka will have on him if he is elected to power.

Whatever the outcome, it is certain that the elections will not merely be a contest between the government and a combination of the main opposition forces. The rivalry between foreign powers, especially the US and India, is likely to play a role in the election and in the affairs of Sri Lanka after the election. What is most worrying is the prospect of choice for the people being limited to a ruler in civilian clothes and a ruler in military uniform, in a country heading towards a dictatorship guided by foreign interests vying for hegemony in the region.

India’s role in the Sri Lankan national question has always been cynical and now, while making a show of unrestrained support for the government, India is seeking to bring together diverse elitist Tamil political forces together as a new post-LTTE Tamil leadership. This is likely to be at loggerheads with the leading elite of the Tamil diaspora in the West, who are resentful of India and are leaning towards the US to resolve the Tamil national question.

New Democracy 35