From the Editor's Desk
Even among those who hailed the lifting of the
state of emergency by the government on 25th August, there is lingering suspicion
about the intentions of the government. That it happened just weeks before the
18th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva ?where alleged
human rights violations and war crimes by the Sri Lankan state were likely to
up for discussion? has made some see it as a publicity stunt to generate international
goodwill.
The fears of the sceptics were justified by
the introduction of new regulations to keep the Prevention of Terrorism Act
and High Security Zones alive. Besides, the continuation and rise in politically
driven authoritarian practices outside the scope of the PTA and Public Security
Ordinance mean that authoritarian rule will not abate with the lifting of the
state of emergency.
The country has, since the JVP insurrection
of 1971, been under a state of emergency for long stretches. Although the UNP
government elected in 1977 declared that it will rule the country without resorting
to emergency regulations, it imposed emergency rule in the North in 1979 and
the whole country later on. More importantly, the absence of a state of emergency
in any part of the country did not mean democratic government. The SLFP, the
left and later the JVP were victims of state sponsored unlawful violence which
took a heavy toll on democratic and trade union rights, let alone the rights
of the minority nationalities. War provided the pretext for extended and excessive
use of emergency powers by the state. As a result, people were intimidated to
the point of fearing to exercise their right to free speech and association.
Initially, emergency regulations in Sri Lanka
were based on the Public Security Ordinance of 1947, designed and ratified by
the British colonial rulers to suppress and control political dissent on the
eve of transfer of power to a loyal government. More dangerous powers have since
been assumed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979? supposedly a temporary
measure but in force to date. Thus, the lifting of the state of emergency while
retaining and reinforcing existing repressive laws is pure sham.
The people suffered severe state repression
under UNP rule, especially the seventeen years of darkness from 1977 to 2004.
The SLFP-led regimes that followed continued with the policies of the UNP on
the economic, foreign policy and other fronts, and relied as much as the UNP
did on the now heavily reinforced police and military forces. The gradual depreciation
of trust in the state was reversed, at least as far as the Sinhalese were concerned,
following the defeat of the LTTE, which symbolised terrorism to them. Also the
People’s Alliance government comprising the SLFP and its parliamentary
left allies is still seen as sensitive to the aspirations of the common masses.
But the violent attack in late May this year by the police on the Katunayake
Free Trade Zone workers who protested against the proposed Pension Bill exposed
once again the brutal nature of state power. The general assumption that the
Sri Lankan state uses force only against the Tamils owing to distrust born of
the civil war between the Government and the LTTE was reinforced by the state
acting in ways that projected it as representative of the majority Sinhalese.
Hence, the attack on Sinhalese workers in Katunayake was a shock, which it should
not have been since the state has used brutal force against the Sinhalese in
the South in 1971 and from the late 1980s to early 1990s.
In this context, one needs to challenge the
general assumption that the defeat of the LTTE will lead to normalcy in the
South and to the resolution of the national question. In reality, the end of
the war has made the prospect of the resolving the national question even more
remote. Prevailing conditions in the North East, especially among ‘resettled
war refugees’, speak volumes about the attitude of the government towards
the minority nationalities, especially the Tamils.
There is no sign of return to normalcy in any
part of the country, and normalcy is unimaginable until the main impediments
to it are removed. The dictatorial executive presidency which has acquired more
power for itself since its institution in 1978, the continuing rise in man power
and might of the armed forces and the police, and the survival of repressive
legislation, besides obstructing return to normalcy, will only add to public
resentment and protest, to which the state is bound to respond with even more
repression.
The unresolved national question remains the main contradiction in the country.
Keeping it unresolved helps the government to divert attention from additional
burdens heaped on the people as a result of the country getting indebted to
foreign powers and thereby becoming a fully fledged neo-colony. Thus imperialism
and foreign hegemony have a vested interest in sustaining a repressive regime
in Sri Lanka.
The task facing the left, progressive and democratic
forces in the country is to unify the struggle for the restoration of democracy
and a just solution for the national question with the anti-imperialist struggle.
New Democracy 42